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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
AARON JEFFERY SCOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48208-2020
Ada County Case No.
CR01-20-14445

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Scott failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
imposed a sentence of seven years with two years determinate upon his conviction for domestic
violence, or that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Scott’s Rule 35 motion
requesting the district court to retain jurisdiction?
ARGUMENT
Scott Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Scott threw his wife, M.K.’s “clothing and other property out onto the grass and into a

pool.” (PSI, pp. 2, 153.) When M.K. tried to take photographs of the scene Scott “shoved [her]
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down and took her phone.” (PSI, pp. 2, 153-54.) When the victim got up and ran to the front yard
Scott “shoved [her] down a second time,” “pinned her against the ground,” “ripped [her] smart
watch from her right wrist,” and “pressed his forearm against the victim’s throat for a few seconds”
with intense pressure, “not allowing her to scream” and making her “light headed” and “fearful.”
(PSI, pp. 2, 154.) When she got out from under his arm enough to scream for help he grabbed her
“mouth with both hands and shook her violently” causing cuts inside her mouth. (PSI, pp. 2, 154.)
After Scott’s arrest and issuance of a no exceptions no-contact order, Scott contacted M.K.
through third parties and arranged to have M.K pick up his phone from the jail. (PSI, pp. 186-89.)
He later called his own phone twice to talk with M.K. and persuade her to offer a version of events
favorable to him. (PSI, pp. 189-94.)
The state charged Scott with domestic violence, attempted strangulation, and two counts
of violation of a no-contact order. (R., pp. 48-49.) Scott pled guilty to domestic violence and one
count of violating a no-contact order. (R., p. 50; Tr., p. 5, L. 16 – p. 16, L. 14.) The district court
imposed a sentence of seven years with two years determinate for domestic battery and 107 days
jail for the misdemeanor. (R., pp. 69-72.)
Scott filed a motion to reduce the sentence on the basis that he was entering the retained
jurisdiction program in another felony case in a different county. (R., pp. 74, 80-84.) The district
court denied the motion, concluding that the decision in the other case “does not dissuade this
Court of the propriety of its judgment and sentence in this case.” (R., pp. 85-86.) Scott also filed
a timely appeal from the judgment. (R., pp. 75-76.)
On appeal Scott contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence and by not granting his Rule 35 motion and retaining jurisdiction. (Appellant’s brief, pp.
3-7.) Application of the relevant standards shows Scott has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s
probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating whether a lower court abused
its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho
261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421
P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
The denial of a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Dabney, 159 Idaho 790, 798, 367 P.3d 185, 193 (2016). In conducting a review
of the grant or denial of a Rule 35 request for leniency, the appellate court applies the same criteria
used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence. State v. Anderson, 163 Idaho
513, 517, 415 P.3d 381, 385 (Ct. App. 2015). A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals
of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 454, 447 P.3d
895, 902 (2019); Anderson, 163 Idaho at 517, 415 P.3d at 385 (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho
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565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)). The appellate court “will not review a defendant’s
underlying sentence for excessiveness when the defendant has appealed only the grant or denial of
his Rule 35 motion unless the motion was supported by new evidence tending to show that the
original sentence was excessive.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903, 341 P.3d 1269, 1272 (Ct.
App. 2014) (citing State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397, 400 (2007); Huffman, 144
Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840).

C.

Scott Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at
736, 170 P.3d at 401. In determining whether the appellant met this burden, the court considers
the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole is exclusively the
province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual
incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing Oliver, 144
Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the appellant must
demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish
the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Farwell, 144
Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to accomplish
the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392 P.3d at 1236-37
(quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
The record shows no abuse of discretion. The district court specifically stated it was
exercising its discretion and applying the relevant legal criteria directing the exercise of that
discretion. (Tr., p. 28, L. 22 – p. 29, L. 8.) The district court also considered the evidence,
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arguments, and statements before it. (Tr., p. 29, Ls. 9-18.) The case was “troubling” to the district
court because Scott “was on felony probation” when he committed the instant crimes and “had
prior offenses for domestic violence” which resulted in him completing “a 52-week domestic
violence treatment program.” (Tr., p. 29, Ls. 19-24.) But “notwithstanding those things, he
committed this violent crime.” (Tr., p. 29, L. 25 – p. 30, L. 1.) This, combined with his “significant
prior criminal history” demonstrated that Scott was “not amenable to supervision at this time.”
(Tr., p. 30, Ls. 2-10.)
The district court was also concerned with Scott’s attempts to “reach out to the victim to
try and persuade her” to provide favorable testimony, which demonstrated both Scott’s
“unwillingness to follow the rules” and his “continuing controlling and manipulative behavior as
it relates to the victim.” (Tr., p. 30, Ls. 11-18.)
Based on these concerns the district court ruled out probation and imposed the sentence of
seven years with two years determinate. (Tr., p. 30, L. 19 – p. 31, L. 4.) The district court
expressed hope that Scott could take advantage of his opportunities to rehabilitate and earn parole
“before too long.” (Tr., p. 31, L. 19 – p. 32, L. 3.) The district court’s factual findings and
reasoning both support its exercise of discretion.
Scott first argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence in light of his “substance abuse, willingness to seek treatment, … family support,”
acceptance of responsibility, and expressions of remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.) However,
the district court specifically considered the materials, arguments, and statements presented. (Tr.,
p. 29, Ls. 9-18.) Scott is merely asking this Court to reweigh those matters. He has failed to show
an abuse of discretion.
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Scott next argues the district court erred by denying his Rule 35 motion requesting the
district court to retain jurisdiction. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-7.) “[W]hether to retain jurisdiction
and place the defendant on probation or relinquish jurisdiction to the Department of Corrections
is a matter of discretion.” State v. Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166, 296 P.3d 371, 372 (2013).
“Refusal to retain jurisdiction will not be deemed a ‘clear abuse of discretion’ if the trial court has
sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.” State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct.
App. 1984). Here the district court specifically found probation to be inappropriate under the facts
of this case. (Tr., p. 30, Ls. 2-21.) Scott claims he was in need of “treatment and help from
professionals through a rider program.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) This argument overlooks the
district court’s determination that Scott already had “about the best [domestic violence treatment
program] that we have to offer,” was already on probation, presumably with all those mitigating
factors Scott relies on in place, and yet committed this crime of violence. (Tr., p. 29, L. 19 – p.
30, L. 21.) Scott’s argument is unpersuasive.
The district court applied the correct legal standards to unchallenged factual findings and
exercised its discretion to impose a reasonable sentence. Scott has failed to show error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 10th day of February, 2021.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of February, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
EMILY M. JOYCE
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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